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ABSTRACT
We describe an algorithm that detects a lack of correspon-
dence between speech and lip motion by detecting and mon-
itoring the degree of synchrony between live audio and vi-
sual signals. It is simple, effective, and computationally inex-
pensive; providing a useful degree of robustness against ba-
sic replay attacks and against speech or image forgeries. The
method is based on a cross-correlation analysis between two
streams of features, one from the audio signal and the other
from the image sequence.
We argue that such an algorithm forms an effective first bar-
rier against several kinds of replay attack that would defeat
existing verification systems based on standard multimodal
fusion techniques. In order to provide an evaluation mecha-
nism for the new technique we have augmented the protocols
that accompany the BANCA multimedia corpus by defining
new scenarios. We obtain 0% equal-error rate (EER) on the
simplest scenario and 35% on a more challenging one 1.
1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous studies have exposed the limits of biometric iden-
tity verification based on a single modality (such as finger-
print, iris, hand-written signature, voice, face). Consequently
many researchers are exploring whether the coordinated use
of two or more modalities can improve performance. The
“talking-face” modality, which includes both face recognition
and speaker verification, is a natural choice for multimodal
biometrics in many practical applications—including face-to-
face scenarios, remote video cameras, and even future per-
sonal digital assistants.
Talking faces provide richer opportunities for verification than
does ordinary multimodal fusion. The signal contains not
only voice and image but also a third source of information:
the simultaneous dynamics of these features. Natural lip mo-
tion and the corresponding speech signal are synchronized.
However, most work on audiovisual speech-based biomet-
rics ignores this third information source: it uses the audio
and video streams separately and performs fusion at the score
level [1] [2]. Nevertheless, some research in speech recog-
nition has shown that it is helpful to take into account the
1This work was initiated in the framework of the First Biosecure Residen-
tial Workshop - http://www.biosecure.info
synchronized lip motion, particularly in noisy environments
[3] [4].
The aim of this paper is to exploit this novel characteristic
of the talking-face modality within the specific framework of
identity verification. Section 4 presents a simple method for
detecting and quantifying the synchronization between speech
and lip motion, based on the correlation between primitive
measures of audiovisual activity. The technique can be used
to augment an existing audio-visual verification system with-
out excessive computational cost. Doing so thwarts a number
of deliberate (so-called “high-effort”) attacks that would de-
feat a standard system.
Many databases are available to the research community to
help evaluate multimodal biometric verification algorithms,
such as BANCA [5], XM2VTS and BIOMET [6]. Different
protocols have been defined for evaluating biometric systems
on each of these databases, but they share the assumption that
impostor attacks are zero-effort attacks. For example, in the
particular framework of the BANCA database, each subject
records one client access and one impostor access per session.
However, the only difference between the two is the particu-
lar message that the client utters—their name and address in
the first case; the target’s name and address in the second.
Thus the ”impersonation” takes place without any knowledge
of the target’s face, age, and voice. These zero-effort impostor
attacks are unrealistic—only a fool would attempt to imitate
a person without knowing anything about them. In this work
we adopt more realistic scenarios in which the impostor has
more information about the target.
This article is organized as follows. The next section presents
the deliberate (as opposed to “zero-effort”) impostor attacks
that we have defined. The following section describes the fea-
tures that our new algorithm uses, while the one after that
describes the algorithm itself. Section 5 describes the evalua-
tion methodology, followed by a presentation of performance
results for the algorithm. The final section summarizes the
results and draws some conclusions.
2. DELIBERATE IMPOSTOR ATTACKS
A major drawback of using the talking-face modality for iden-
tity verification is that an impostor can easily obtain a sam-
ple of any client’s audiovisual identity. Contrast this with iris
recognition: it is quite difficult to acquire a sample of another
person’s iris. But numerous small devices allow an impostor
to take a picture of the target’s face without being noticed,
and some mobile phones are even able to record movies. Of
course, it is even easier to acquire a recording of the target’s
voice. Therefore, protocols to evaluate audiovisual identity
verification systems should recognize this fact, for example
by adding replay attacks to their repertoire of envisaged im-
postor accesses.
2.1. Paparazzi scenario
In this scenario, prior to the attack the impostor takes a still
picture of the target’s face and acquires an audio recording
of their voice. Then, when trying to spoof the system, the
impostor simply places the picture in front of the camera and
plays the audio recording. The purpose of this scenario is to
illustrate the limits of a system that does not take into account
the dynamics of lips motion. It has already been tackled in
[7].
2.2. Big Brother scenario
In this scenario, prior to the attack the impostor records a
movie of the target’s face, instead of a still picture, and ac-
quires a voice recording as before. However, the audio and
video do not come from the same utterance, so they are not
synchronised. This is a realistic assumption in situations where
the identity verification protocol chooses an utterance for the
client to speak. Using the same process as in the Paparazzi
scenario, the impostor tries to spoof the system by a simple
replay attack. In this paper, we address this kind of impostor
attack by detecting lack of synchronisation between the audio
and video streams.
2.3. Forgery scenarios
More elaborate impostor attacks can include voice and face
forgery. Perrot et al. [8] use a recording of the target’s voice,
and automatically transform the impostor’s voice so that it re-
sembles the recorded utterance. Abboud and Chollet [9] track
the impostor’s lip motion throughout a video sequence, and
then animate the target’s face in a way that moves their lips
to match the impostor’s. A combination of these two forg-




Let y be the audio signal from a BANCA sequence. Every 10






Therefore, 100 samples are extracted per second. Then, a
simple voice activity detector based on a bi-gaussian model-
ing of signal energy distribution is applied: this gives the time
stamps allowing to distinguish between silence and voice ac-
tivity.
3.2. Visual features
For each frame, the lip area is manually located with a rectan-
gle r of size proportional to 20x30 and centered on the mouth
(as shown in figure 1) and converted to gray-level. Finally,
Fig. 1. Manual location of the lips
the mean of the values of the pixels of the lip area (of width









Audiovisual sequences of the BANCA database are recorded
at 25 frames per second. Therefore, 25 samples are extracted
per second.
3.3. Different sample rates
As a result of these separate processes of features extraction,
audio and visual features are sampled at two different rates.
The proposed algorithm deals with audio and video features
that must have the same sample rate. Three techniques are
proposed to balance the sample rates:
Downsampling the audio signal Every 4 audio samples, only
their average value is kept;
Duplicating samples of the visual signal After every sample,
3 identical samples are added;
Linearly interpolating the visual signal Between two sam-
ples, 3 linearly interpolated samples are added.
4. AUDIOVISUAL SYNCHRONY MODELLING
4.1. State of the art
Very few previous works on the particular subject of liveness
detection based on speech/lips synchronisation were found in
the literature. In [7], a Gaussian Mixture Model is learnt
on the concatenated audio (MFCC coefficients) and visual
(eigenlips projection) features. An Equal Error Rate (EER)
of 2% is reached on the equivalent of the Paparazzi scenario.
4.2. Preliminary observation
The initial observation that led to a simple model based on
correlation between audio and video features is presented in
Figure 2. The upper signal is the energy of speech and the
bottom one is the openness of the mouth, both extracted from
the same audiovisual sequence. The shadowed parts of the
curves emphasize how similar and correlated these two sig-
nals can be. In our particular case, we chose the mean of
Fig. 2. Speech energy vs. Mouth openness
pixels value instead of the openness because it is easier and
faster to compute, supposing that when the mouth is open,
pixels are darker and vice versa.
4.3. Cross-correlation
Let A(t) and V (t) be two one-dimensional random variables
representing respectively the audio and the visual samples.
The cross-correlation X(d) (d ∈ [−L,L]) between A and V
is defined as follows:
X(d) = E(A˜(t) · V˜ (t− d)) (3)
where S˜ is the centered and variance-normalized version of
S ∈ {A, V }. In our case, where A(t) and V (t) are only






A˜(t) · V˜ (t− d) (4)
assuming that V˜ (t) = 0 for t < 1 and t > T .
4.4. Training
Lmax(X) = argmaxd∈[−L,L]|X(d)| (5)
is the delay for which the correlation between A and V is
maximum. Figures 3 and 4 show how it is computed and
what is its distribution on two training sets: synchronised and
artificially desynchronised (audio from one sequence, video
from another one). Then, Lsync is defined as the delay cor-
responding to the peak in the synchronised training set distri-
bution.
4.5. Testing
When testing the synchronisation of a new sequence AV =
{A, V }, the score s of AV is computed as follows:




Fig. 3. Example of Lmax(X) and its distribution on 208 synchronised
sequences
Fig. 4. Example of Lmax(X) and its distribution on 208 not-synchronised
sequences
According to a given threshold θ ∈ [0, 1], the sequence AV
is decided to be synchronised if s(AV ) ≥ θ and not synchro-
nised if s(AV ) < θ.
5. EXPERIMENTS
The protocols we used are inspired by the original BANCA
Mc protocol [5]. Thus the 52 speakers are divided into two
groups (G1 and G2) with 13 females and 13 males in each
one. Each speaker recorded four sessions (S1 to S4) during
which two accesses were performed (client and impostor).
These two groups are completely independent: when G1 is
used for training tests are performed on G2, and vice versa.
For reasons stated in the introduction, we adapted them to
simulate more realistic scenarios. Two new protocols were
designed in which training and client access sequences are
identical to the original BANCA Mc protocol, but with mod-
ified impostor access sequences:
Paparazzi protocol The video is made of only one repeating
frame, while the audio is kept unchanged;
Big Brother protocol The video is taken from a different se-
quence, while the audio is kept unchanged.
6. RESULTS
The system obtained 0% equal-error rate (EER) on the Pa-
parazzi scenario, because the visual signal for the impostor
was constant and thus completely uncorrelated with the audio
signal. In the more challenging Big Brother scenario, the sys-
tem with the best tuned parameters obtained 35% EER.
Figure 5 shows the influence of parameter L (which was in-
troduced in section 4.3). It appears that the best value lies
between 20 and 50, which corresponds to a delay of between
1 and 2 seconds.
Using time-stamps of voice activity, silence frames were deleted
in the audio and visual signals. Indeed, it has been noticed
that when people are taking breath between two utterances,
Fig. 5. Influence of maximum delay L on Equal Error Rate
they sometimes open their mouths: this fact is an obvious po-
tential source of error for our system. Figure 6 shows that
deleting silence frames gives better performance.
Fig. 6. Influence of silence frames deletion
Figure 7 shows the influence on performance of the method
used to balance sample rates. The left curve compares lin-
ear interpolation with the duplication of visual samples. It
appears that the latter is slightly better, probably because no
artificial data is produced. The right curve shows that upsam-
pling the visual samples or downsampling the audio samples
does not cause any significant difference.
Fig. 7. Influence of sample rate balance
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that account should be taken of the
synchronization between the audio and video signals in au-
diovisual identify verification, in order to defeat sophisticated
attacks and forgeries. Since the problem of skilled attacks
is not treated by standard evaluation techniques, we have de-
fined new protocols for the BANCA database in order to aug-
ment the existing evaluation methodology.
A simple algorithm has been developed to detect and measure
synchrony, and tested against two realistic attack scenarios us-
ing the BANCA database. An error rate of 0% was reached
on the simplest scenario, Paparazzi, where a still picture is
placed before the camera. Preliminary work using features
related to a more accurate shape of the mouth (such as its
openness), instead of the simple features we have described,
suggest encouraging results. However, robust automatic lip
tracking is still needed to further improve the method, and we
plan work in this area in order to further improve defences
against higher-effort impostor attacks.
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